International Framework Agreements: global industrial relations between rights and bargaining
The globalisation of the last decades has challenged (Northern) labour's traditional practices of internationalism at the national and the international level. as well as in periodic evaluations and reviews (Müller and Rüb 2002; Rüb 2002) . Disputes within the remit of IFAs are dealt with along the hierarchy of industrial relations structures. Called in after local disputes could not be resolved, the IMF, for example, succeeded in gaining trade union rights in a Turkish supplier of DaimlerChrysler; in another case a Brazilian supplier lost its contract as a result of non-compliance with the terms of the IFA (see IMF 2003; Anner et al. 2004) .
A very different picture can be observed in sectors where trade union strength is uneven and/or where employer strategies traditionally have been more hostile.
In this context IFAs are often the result of campaigns at local and global level, aiming to secure organising rights in the first place. The agreement between French hotel and services chain Accor and the International Union of Foodworkers (IUF), for example, was used by the IUF to campaign and organise across the group's global operations (Wills 2002) . Another case of this use of IFAs (as well as the difficulties in transnational organising) is the agreement between Chiquita, the IUF and COLSIBA, the Latin-American Coordination of Banana Workers' Unions (Riisgaard 2005) .
IFAs can thus result from the activities of different trade union structures and may go part of the way towards establishing regular bargaining relations. They can equally constitute the starting point for putting labour on the map by according it organising rights in the first place. This paper focuses on the emergence of IFAs and, via an overview of their substantive and procedural content, elaborates the distinction between 'bargaining' agreements and 'rights' agreements. The paper concludes by discussing a range of important strategic and innovative issues IFAs raise for trade unions.
An emerging international industrial relations governance
In parallel to major shifts occurring in the world economy, trade unions have developed their political and strategic repertoire. As early as the 1920s (Fimmen 1924 ), but in a more concerted form since the 1960s (Levinson 1972) , trade unionists reflected on the nature of the multinational corporation and its implications for organised labour (Ramsay 1997 (Greven 2003; Rüb 2002; Herod 2001; Ramsay 1997 (Baker n.d.) Despite these impasses at the level of international social dialogue, the 1990s have to be seen as an important turning point in transnational labour strategy.
Parallel to an emerging new global political economy, labour increasingly reestablished itself as an actor in this framework and started to shape new practices and institutions of international industrial relations. First, it succeeded in capturing some of the 'corporate social responsibility' terrain through its critical involvement in formulating codes of corporate conduct and, particularly, in promoting core labour rights in the so-called social clause campaign (van Roozendaal 2002; EWCB 2000a; EWCB 2000b) . Secondly, labour extended some of the 1960s' World Company Councils work. Trade unions established a number of structures, including councils and networks, in MNCs, thereby laying the foundations for continuous transnational union cooperation (Rüb 2002; EWCB 2001; EWCB 2000c) . Thirdly, and related to both of these developments, is the emergence of IFAs (EWCB 2004a; EWCB 2004b) . Table 1 ). The size of companies ranges from Ballast Nedam and Prym with 4 000 employees to Carrefour, DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen with more than 300 000 employees. Differences in company size and sector highlight the challenges faced by labour organisations if they are to organise, implement and monitor such agreements, as well as the potential of extending framework agreements along global supply chains. The IUF/Danone agreement clearly sets an important benchmark in that it explicitly refers to ILO Conventions (see Table 2  it must be a global agreement;
 Conventions must be referenced to the ILO;
 it has to require the MNC to influence suppliers;
 a Global Union Federation should be signatory;
 there has to be trade union involvement in the implementation; and  there has to be a right to bring complaints. A closer analysis of the agreements reveals a number of differences with regard to their form and procedure. Whereas some IFAs emphasise the establishment of fundamental rights, there are others that come much closer to bargaining agreements, in that they contain detailed provisions about regular meetings, deal with a range of issues beyond core labour rights and are meant to be discussed, renegotiated or prolonged after certain intervals.
This should not be taken as an exclusionary distinction, but as an analytical 
What's in it? Substantive issues in IFAs
All IFAs operate on the principle of respecting minimum standards for labour and human rights, as well as complying with national legal and industry regulations. In the light of the number of ratifications of ILO conventions (see 
Strategic issues
Despite their recent proliferation, the development of IFAs as an industrial relations practice is in its initial stages. This is particularly the case regarding 
Trade union capacity and IFAs
The question 'how many ways to an IFA?' can also be used to think about 
IFAs across the supply chain
Arguably, one of the most important innovations of IFAs is that they allow trade unions a grip on the global supply chain, thereby extending (core) labour rights beyond national borders. There is considerable potential in using concepts of commodity chain analysis to think about global trade union campaigning and organising (Fichter and Sydow 2002) .
Regarding the extension to the supply chain, a number of different concepts can be distinguished. Monitoring stretches from integration of the agreement into the internal corporate audit (Leoni and DaimlerChrysler) to being included in the work of a separate compliance organisation (IKEA). MNCs at the end of buyer-driven commodity chains find advantages in making the framework agreement part of the contractual obligations of suppliers and subcontractors, together with a host of other obligations (Gereffi 1999 (Miller 2004; Greven 2003; Herod 2001; Russo 1999) . To make an (very schematic) analytic distinction, it may be argued that IFAs in buyer-driven supply chains function more as 'rights' agreements, reflecting a flatter but more flexible supply structure and a 'social responsibility governance'. In contrast, IFAs in producer-driven chains (with longstanding relations with suppliers and R&D connections) function more as 'bargaining' agreements, some monitoring of which is integrated into the internal corporate audit.
Conclusion
To sum up, it is reasonable and useful to locate IFAs on a continuum of 
